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Autonomous open-source hardware apparatus for quantum key
distribution
Ignacio H. Lo´pez Grande,1 Christian T. Schmiegelow,2 Miguel A. Larotonda1∗
We describe an autonomous, fully functional implementation of the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol using open source hardware microcontrollers for the synchronization,
communication, key sifting and real-time key generation diagnostics. The quantum bits are
prepared in the polarization of weak optical pulses generated with light emitting diodes,
and detected using a sole single-photon counter and a temporally multiplexed scheme. The
system generates a shared cryptographic key at a rate of 365 bps, with a raw quantum bit
error rate of 2.7%. A detailed description of the peripheral electronics for control, driving
and communication between stages is released as supplementary material. The device can
be built using simple and reliable hardware and it is presented as an alternative for a
practical realization of sophisticated, yet accessible quantum key distribution systems.
I. Introduction
The main goal of cryptography is to obtain a se-
cure method to share information. This is usu-
ally achieved by the encryption of the data, us-
ing a shared cryptographic key. The security of
the protocol then relies on the secrecy of this key.
The distribution of a secret key is therefore a cru-
cial task for any symmetric-key cryptographic algo-
rithm. Classically, this can be achieved using the
Diffie-Hellman method, or some variation based on
it [1].
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols ex-
ploit the quantum no-cloning theorem [2] and the
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indistinguishability upon measurement of quan-
tum states belonging to non-orthogonal, conjugate
bases to accomplish secure distribution of crypto-
graphic keys [3]. These features, combined with the
fact that a measurement performed on a quantum
system disturbs its original state in some manner,
are the fundamental principles in which every QKD
protocol is based on, since they allow for the de-
tection of an eventual eavesdropper by monitoring
errors on the exchanged key: the attacker cannot
completely determine the measured quantum state,
nor can she/he copy it; therefore she/he must re-
send some imperfect copy to the receiver, which
may introduce errors in the key. However, a practi-
cal real-world QKD implementation is still a tech-
nical challenge that combines concepts and tech-
nologies from different areas, such as classical and
quantum information theory, quantum optics, elec-
tronics and optoelectronics [4]. In this work, we de-
scribe a functional autonomous apparatus that im-
plements the BB84 quantum key distribution pro-
tocol [5] where we implement several solutions that
contribute to the affordability of a naturally costly
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piece of equipment.
A critical parameter for the security of any quan-
tum cryptography protocol is the Quantum Bit Er-
ror Rate (QBER), which is obtained after an error
estimation from the sifted keys SA and SB —which
in theory should be identical— and in the absence
of an eavesdropper they are similar up to experi-
mental errors: a small part of the key is randomly
selected and used to obtain the QBER, which gives
an estimation of the error rate in the whole length
of the key. Once the protocol is running, the QBER
is routinely monitored by resigning part of the key.
It is assumed that any increase of the QBER may
be generated by the presence of an eavesdropper; in
such case the whole key is discarded. Theoretical
upper limits have been found for the QBER rate
that if preserved, unconditional security of the key
can be granted [6] by applying classical error cor-
rection and privacy amplification protocols to the
sifted key [7].
The first implementation of a quantum crypto-
graphic protocol dates from 1992 [8]. Since then,
the field has rapidly advanced towards sophisti-
cated systems that provide high speed key gener-
ation [9], long distance key distribution [10, 11],
transmitting photons either over optical fiber or
open air, using polarization or time bin [12], or
both [13], for qubit-encoding. Such protocols can
be based on single photon pulses [14, 15] or on en-
tangled photon states [19]. The use of advanced op-
toelectronics and high performance detectors is in-
tensive on any QKD implementation. In this work
we show that the technologies used in such quan-
tum information algorithms are mature enough to
attempt a low cost, yet functional and robust imple-
mentation of a quantum key distribution protocol.
We give a detailed explanation of the communica-
tion scheme and we release the firmware code and
the circuit schematics to build the control units as
Supplementary Material. The following section is
devoted to the description of the optical arrange-
ments used on Alice and Bob stages. Section III.
discusses the initial setup, synchronization, trans-
mission and processing routines needed in order to
generate a sifted key. The overall performance of
the apparatus and its response to different pertur-
bations are discussed thereafter.
II. Device layout
The developed system comprises an emission stage
and a reception stage for the quantum channel, and
an ad-hoc classical communication system. Quan-
tum bits are encoded in the polarization of weak co-
herent pulses. These pulses are used as an approx-
imation of a single photon pulsed source. We iden-
tify the canonical polarization states {|H〉 , |V 〉}
with the computational basis BC = {|0〉 , |1〉} and
the diagonal polarization states {|D〉 , |A〉} with the
diagonal basis BD = {|+〉 , |−〉}. The complete
scheme of the apparatus is shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Setup of the QKD system: Polarization
selection and spatial overlap between states is ob-
tained with a combination of Polarizing (PBS) and
non-polarizing (BS) Beam Splitters. Bob uses a BS
to randomly choose the measurement basis. Polar-
ization projections are obtained with a PBS and a
half waveplate (HWP). Projected light is coupled
into optical fibers and temporally multiplexed with
selected delays. A single photon counting module
(SPCM) is used for detection and bandpass filters
(BPF) are used to reject unwanted light. ∆t: 250
ns delay.
Polarized weak light pulses are generated by fast
pulsing four infrared LEDs and combining them
with Polarizing (PBS) and Non-Polarizing (BS)
Beamsplitters: each of the LEDs is used to encode
one of the four possible polarization states. The
LEDs outputs are coupled and later decoupled to
multimode optical fibers to define a propagation
direction and divergence, and also to equalize the
intensities of the four outputs. This setup is based
on off-the-shelf economic infrared LEDs and avoids
the use of expensive Pockel’s cells and high per-
formance HV drivers for polarization state prepa-
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ration. The mean photon number per pulse was
set to approximately 0.1, measured between the
emission and detection stages. Assuming Poisso-
nian photon statistics, this means that in average
nearly 90% of the clock pulses carry no photons at
all, while less than 0.5% of the pulses are multi-
photon pulses. Both empty and multiple detection
runs are considered null. It is worth to note that
this particular choice of photon number per pulse
does not guarantee the generation of a secure key
by itself; rather, the conditions for distillation of a
secure key from a raw key and the optimum photon
rate depend on specific conditions of the setup, such
as the length of the quantum channel –that implies
distance-dependent losses–, the loss on Bob’s re-
ceiver stage, and the efficiency and dark count rate
of the detectors. Security conditions under differ-
ent kind of attacks on non-ideal QKD systems have
been reported for example in [16, 17] and reviewed
in [18].
The light paths from the sources entering a po-
larization beam splitter (PBS) at different inputs
were combined by pairs: the reflected beams exit
the PBS vertically polarized, while the transmit-
ted outputs are left horizontally polarized. A half-
waveplate retarder placed in one of the outputs ro-
tates the polarization of these two paths 45 degrees.
A beam splitter cube further combines the paired
sources into one common path.
Basis selection at the receiver stage is obtained
using a 50% beam splitter cube to randomly obtain
either a transmitted photon or a reflected photon.
Projection onto the states of the canonical basis is
achieved by means of a PBS, while the diagonal
basis projections are obtained adding a half-wave
plate retarder between the beam splitter and the
PBS in one of the paths. A straightforward im-
plementation of the detection stage demands four
single photon counting modules (SPCMs), which
are expensive devices. With the purpose of obtain-
ing a practical, cost-effective setup we implemented
a time multiplexed detection, adding 250 ns delays
between the projection paths. The four possible
measurement outcomes are encoded into temporal
bins: photons are detected using only one commer-
cial single photon counting module and labeled by
the time of arrival with respect to a clock reference.
Temporal demultiplexing and state determination
are obtained measuring coincidences between the
single photon detector output and temporal gates
with selected delays. The use of a sole detector
also avoids the unbalance of detection efficiencies
that is present in multiple detector setups. As a
drawback, this scheme presents 4 dB insertion loss
per coupler, which attenuates the input signal and
lowers the extractable secure key rate, due to the
reduced optimal photon rate. This issue can be
circumvented by implementing a decoy-state strat-
egy together with the BB84 protocol [20–22]. Such
application is currently under development at our
laboratory.
The following section deals with the synchroniza-
tion and control tasks performed by the open source
hardware microcontrollers that allow the system to
operate in an autonomous manner.
III. Control, driving and synchro-
nization
i. Control and temporal synchronization
Open-source hardware was chosen for the process-
ing of the cryptographic key and controlling units
of the system, in order to obtain a practical, small-
scale photonic implementation of the quantum pro-
tocol: all the synchronization, communication and
processing operations, as well as system diagnosis
were programmed on Arduino Mega 2560 micro-
controllers. A diagram of the key generation pro-
tocol is sketched in Fig. 2. The communication
scheme is divided in stages where classical informa-
tion is exchanged (C COM) and a quantum com-
munication stage (Q COM). An initial calibration
of the system can be performed, where both par-
ties measure the photon rate per pulse, the total
temporal delay of the link and the delay between
temporal bins. The communication begins with an
exchange of the protocol parameters such as data
structure and target key length. Then, after a syn-
chronization sequence, they exchange the quantum
bits and the sifting procedure follows: both par-
ties exchange information on basis emission and
detection and coincidences between them, keeping
only the bits that come from coincident bases. The
routine is repeated until the target key length is
reached. The shared key is locally transferred to
personal computers on each stage via USB ports.
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Figure 2: Communication and control setup of the BB84 QKD apparatus. The protocol is controlled by
two Arduino Mega microprocessors. The synchronization start byte is generated at Bob’s side and sent
through an interrupt channel. After the quantum bits are sent and detected, bases are exchanged and
the key is sifted. Specific input and output pins of the Arduino controllers are detailed in the figure.
ii. Electronic driving and peripherals
The communication routines described above are
implemented directly by the microcontrollers. Spe-
cific tasks such as driving the pulsed LEDs, syn-
chronizing the temporal mask and demultiplexing
the temporal signals at the receiver side are per-
formed with dedicated electronic peripherals.
Based on a random 2-bit sequence, the Arduino
microcontroller sets a logic high on one of the four
possible outputs. A monostable multivibrator uses
this logic transition to generate a 20 ns pulse that
is used as the input for a high speed LED driver.
The shunt driving circuit that pulses the current on
each LED is constructed using the high-current, low
impedance pull-up and pull-down MOSFET tran-
sistors at the output of NAND gates and a passive
network to provide a prebias current and current
overshoot to increase the performance of pulsed
LED drivers [23]. The optical pulse duration of
25 ns is limited by the LED response.
At Bob’s side, single photon pulses are routed
through different delay paths according to their po-
larization, and the delayed photon clicks are iden-
tified as polarization state projections by temporal
demultiplexing the digital detections. Pulses from
the single photon detector are addressed to the
corresponding state channel by comparison with
a pulse pattern that repeats the temporal delays
added by the optical fibers.
IV. System performance and self-
diagnostics
The main cause of bit errors are the non-ideal polar-
ization splitting contrast of the PBSs and low qual-
ity waveplates that produce incomplete rotations
and distort the ideal linear polarization states at
the input and output. Also, off-the plane misalign-
ment of the light paths within the preparation and
measuring states can induce undesired rotations of
the polarization axes. These are well-known prob-
lems for an open air optical setup, and workarounds
to minimize them are common to any polarization-
sensitive arrangement. Detector dark counts and
stray light that leaks through the optical setup are
also a source of error. The gated detection helps
to minimize these errors. The contribution of this
effect to the overall error rate depends linearly on
the gate pulse duration.
The other main source of error is the tempo-
ral jitter of the signals, which can produce erro-
neous bit assignment of the temporally multiplexed
pulses. The signal jitter is limited by the duration
of the light pulse, which is approximately half the
Arduino clock period. Larger pulse timing fluctu-
ations can be produced at the generation and de-
tection stages due to missed or added clock pulses
at the microprocessors, specifically when handling
interrupt signals. These temporal fluctuations can
shift states from earlier to later temporal bins, in-
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ducing errors on the key. The temporal order of
the multiplexed states can be arranged to minimize
such errors. A natural choice is to order the detec-
tions in the sequence H (first), V , D, A (last). Such
choice has an increased probability that temporal
jitter can produce an error: assuming delayed de-
tections that deterministically shift the states; in
this configuration the probability of producing a
bit error is 0.3125. If the delays are arranged to
output the temporal sequence H (first), D, V , A
(last), consecutive states at the detection pattern
do not belong to the same basis. The probabil-
ity of producing an error provided the states are
identified in an adjacent temporal bin in this ar-
rangement is 0.1875, and it is therefore chosen to
minimize the error rate. An estimation of the bit
error rate produced by this artifact in the actual
protocol execution can be obtained as the product
of this probability and the state-shift rate due to
the overall timing jitter (0.6%), and gives approxi-
mately 1.1%. The system was tested using a mean
photon rate of µ=0.09. A typical light distribution
at the outputs for each polarization state generated
by Alice is shown in Fig. 3a).
The apparatus autonomously generates a crypto-
graphic key until the target key length is reached.
During the tests, light pulses were emitted in bursts
of 19200 pulses per second, while a constant back-
ground light of 3000 counts/s at the detector was
present in the actual experimental conditions. We
obtained a raw key generation rate of 363 bits/s,
with a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of 2.7 %.
Approximately one third of this rate (0.9 %) cor-
responds to errors produced by stray light and de-
tector dark counts, while the rest of the errors are
due to the electronic jitter as discussed above, and
to an imperfect preparation and selection of the
polarization states at the optical setup. The mea-
sured key generation rate is limited by (and it can
be also estimated from) the photon-per-pulse rate,
the 50% data that is discarded in average due to
non-coincident bases, and the dead times on the
communication stage that allow for data process-
ing, which represents roughly two thirds of the total
execution time.
During a key generation session, some param-
eters can be monitored for eavesdropping, incon-
sistencies or anomalous behavior. The sifted key
can be periodically sampled and analyzed for error
rate, key generation rate and bias rate (the rela-
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Figure 3: a) Light distribution at the detection
channels, for each generated polarization state.
Percentages on each row of the graph are the rela-
tive amounts of light obtained by adding the counts
at each detection channel, for all the emitted states.
b) Temporal evolution of different system parame-
ters during normal operation.
tive abundance of “1”s to “0”s in the key, 0.98 in
our setup), leading to charts like the one presented
on Fig. 3b). Under normal operation conditions,
the three parameters are constant through a typi-
cal one hour and a half experiment, with a relative
dispersion on their average values below 2 × 10−2
for key rate, 7× 10−3 for bit bias and 2× 10−3 for
QBER (statistics obtained over 20 kbit partitions
from a total 1.9 Mbit key).
The response of the system under anomalous
conditions was tested disturbing the quantum chan-
nel in different manners, while the above parame-
ters were being monitored. Figure 4 shows a se-
quence of such perturbations: first, in a), the de-
tector was blocked, which caused the key rate to
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vanish with a characteristic time given by the in-
tegration time of the monitoring process. If one of
the detection channels (V ) is blocked [Fig. 4 b)],
the effect is a diminished key rate and a key bias of
2/3. In c), both channels of a basis are blocked. If
two channels that encode the same bit are blocked,
the key rate remains at half the original rate, but
now the series is completely biased, since only one
logic bit is produced. More interestingly, during e),
a PBS was inserted in the quantum channel, which
has the following effect on the transmitted quan-
tum states: |H〉 are left unchanged —since they
are transmitted through the PBS— |V 〉 states are
reflected out of the path at the PBS, while |D〉 and
|A〉 are transmitted as |H〉 with a 50% chance. This
last feature resembles the action of an eavesdrop-
per (Eve) using an intercept-resend strategy, where
the bases in which Eve resends bits to Bob are ran-
domly chosen. In this situation, states sent as |V 〉,
and (in average) half of the states originally sent on
the diagonal basis, are lost at the PBS reflection,
leading to a reduction of the key generation rate by
a factor of two. More importantly, half of the states
originally sent on the diagonal basis are transmit-
ted through the PBS and transformed to the |H〉
state. If these states are measured on the diagonal
basis, they can be detected as either |D〉 or |A〉,
regardless of the original state. The result of these
successive projections is that a |D〉 (|A〉) state has
a non-negligible probability to be detected as a |A〉
(|D〉) state. The quantum bit error rate now raises
to 25% for this particular perturbation, signaling a
possible eavesdropper. The bit bias of Bob’s key is
0.75: the action of the PBS that prevents all the
emitted |V 〉 states to be detected generates a ratio
of “1”s to “0”s of 3:1. Periodically sampling and an
analysis of the generated key thus provides a means
for detecting intercept-resend attacks, at the cost
of reducing the final key length. With the setup
placed on an optical table, QBER variations as low
as 0.2% can be detected.
V. Concluding remarks
We have implemented an open source hardware
based autonomous QKD apparatus. Its stabil-
ity and performance have been tested on megabit-
length key distribution sessions, during which some
key parameters were monitored. The device was
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Figure 4: Behavior of the system under different
perturbations on the detection stage and the quan-
tum channel, labeled a) to e), consisting in blocking
one or more detection channels and inserting a po-
larizing beamsplitter in the quantum channel. See
the text for a detailed explanation.
designed with a cost-effectiveness approach which
includes a LED-based single photon probabilistic
source, a time multiplexed detection scheme that
employs only one SPCM and Arduino-based con-
trolling and processing units for Alice and Bob.
The actual bit error rate can be lowered if the po-
larization dependent elements (PBS) on Alice and
Bob sides are replaced with high-extinction ratio
polarizers (at present around 1%). Another way in
which the error rate can be improved is by minimiz-
ing the incidence of errors originated by detector’s
dark counts. This can be accomplished with a re-
duction on the light pulse width that leads to nar-
rower temporal gates. Also, an increase of the mean
photon number per pulse can reduce the QBER
without compromising security, provided a decoy
state protocol is implemented instead.
The overall protocol speed can be raised by re-
placing the Arduino microcontrollers with faster
FPGA-based boards, where the communication
and the processing blocks may be parallelized.
Also, as mentioned above, the temporal demulti-
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plexing can be done directly on the board. Faster
clock boards allow for an additional reduction of
the temporal delays between channels on the time
multiplexed detection scheme. These can be set to
be as short as 50 ns, depending on pulse width and
temporal jitter.
The developed apparatus is able to au-
tonomously generate a cryptographic key with lim-
ited yet simply improvable performance. The whole
system can be used to establish a small-scale se-
cure information channel between eye of sight dis-
tance sites, for academic purposes, or it can serve
as a testbed for different quantum information-
related resources, such as original protocols, de-
tectors, light sources, or the development of al-
ternative physical quantum channels. We under-
stand that a cryptographic system based on well-
known, simple and available technology that can be
fully mastered and controlled by the end user may
turn out more useful and secure than a sophisti-
cated, “black box” type system that has many parts
that are beyond the user’s control, and which may
depend on third party services to be operated or
maintained.
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